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This paper aims at disentangling the role played by different explanations on the urban wage 
premium along the wage distribution. We analyze the wage dynamics of migrants from lower 
to higher density areas in Italy, using quantile regressions and individual data. The results 
show that unskilled workers benefit more from a wage premium accruing over time, while 
skilled workers enjoy a wage premium when they migrate as well as a wage increase over time. 
Further, we find that for unskilled workers the wage growth over time is mainly due to human 
capital accumulation in line with the “learning” hypothesis, while for skilled workers the wage 
growth is mainly explained by the “coordination” hypothesis, i.e., cities enhance the 




JEL Classification: J31, J61, R23. 
 
Keywords: Urban Wage Premium, Human Capital, Spatial Sorting, Wage Distribution, 




                                               
** We thank the research partnership between ISFOL - Area Mercato del Lavoro (Rome) - and Dipartimento di 
Scienze Sociali ed Economiche- University of Rome “La Sapienza” - for access to the databases. We are very 
grateful to Roger Koenker and Ivan Canay for suggestions concerning the implementation of the quantile 
fixed effect procedures, and to Gianmarco Ottaviano and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Our 
thanks also go to the participants in the AIEL conference (Milan, 2011, Naple 2012), ERSA conference 
(Barcelona, 2011), UB seminar (Barcelona, 2011), Crenos seminar (Cagliari, 2012), EALE conference (Bonn, 
2012), SAEe conference (Vigo, 2012), ICEEE conference (Genoa, 2013) and OFCE Science Po seminar (Nice, 
2014) for useful suggestions. Alessia Matano expresses her gratitude for the financial support received from 
the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through the project ECO2013-41022-R.  
1 Alessia Matano, University of Barcelona UB, AQR-IREA, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, Dipartimento di 
Scienze Sociali ed Economiche. Email: amatano@ub.edu.  
2 Corresponding Author: Paolo Naticchioni, University of Roma Tre, IZA. Email: p.naticchioni@gmail.com.  
 2 
1. Introduction 
The existence and extent of the urban wage premium have been widely investigated in the 
spatial economic literature, and various different theories have been proposed. The most 
widely accepted explanation refers to urbanization externalities in terms of reduced 
transport costs, technology and knowledge spillovers, cheaper inputs, proximity to 
consumers and market potential (Glaeser, 1998, Kim, 1987, Ciccone and Hall, 1996, 
Hanson, 2005). According to this theoretical framework, workers moving to cities should 
immediately experience wage level increases, while those leaving cities should experience 
wage losses (wage level effect). More recently, a “learning” explanation has been proposed, 
i.e. in cities human capital accumulation is faster (Glaeser, 1999, Moretti, 2004, Glaeser and 
Resseger, 2010). In this framework, workers moving to cities will only experience wage 
increases over time (wage growth effect), while those leaving cities will not necessarily 
suffer wage losses. Another explanation that entails the possibility of a wage growth effect 
being generated is the “coordination” hypothesis, since cities enhance the probability of a 
better match between workers and firms, and this probability increases with the time spent 
in cities (Kim, 1990, Helsley and Strange, 1990, Yankow, 2006). Furthermore, the literature 
has also pointed out the importance of controlling for the sorting of workers, since the 
urban wage premium could be the outcome, at least partially, of skilled workers being 
sorted into cities (Combes et al., 2008, Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, Matano and 
Naticchioni, 2012).  
From the empirical point of view, the first paper that discussed and tested the role 
played by the different explanations is Glaeser and Maré (2001), which analyzes the 
determinants of the urban wage premium in the US. In particular, the authors analyze the 
migration flows from rural-to-urban areas (and vice versa), in order to disentangle the 
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wage growth effect from the wage level effect. Glaeser and Maré (2001) also perform fixed 
effects estimates to control for the sorting of workers. Their results show that a non-
negligible part of the urban wage premium accrues to workers over time and is retained 
when they leave cities, in line with the wage growth explanation. Nonetheless, the authors 
also find evidence of the wage level effect.  
More recently, other papers have extended the analysis of Glaeser and Maré (2001) to 
investigate further the determinants of wage growth in cities, focusing on the within- and 
between-jobs wage growth components which represent a proxy of the “learning” and 
“coordination” hypothesis (Yankow, 2006, Wheeler, 2006, Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012).  
The original contribution offered by this paper lies in extending to the whole wage 
distribution the analysis of the role played by the different theoretical explanations in 
accounting for the urban wage premium, which represents an unexplored field of research 
in the spatial economic literature, to the best of our knowledge. More specifically, we 
investigate whether the extent of the wage level and wage growth effects is different for 
skilled and unskilled workers. We refer to skilled workers as those located at the upper tail 
of the wage distribution and to unskilled workers as those located at the lower tail of the 
wage distribution.3 Another original contribution of the paper relies on the investigation of 
the drivers of the wage growth effect along the wage distribution. 
We make use of the Italian employer-employee INPS (the Italian Social Security 
Institute) database, from 1986-2003. In the first part of the paper we analyze the wage 
dynamics of migrants from lower to higher, and from higher to lower, density provinces, 
                                               
3 Note that in this paper we do not exploit direct measures of occupation to identify the skill level, since we 
rely on the wage percentiles. This is also due to the fact that in our dataset the occupation information is  
highly aggregated (blue vs white collar workers).  
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by means of a quantile regression approach.4 Moreover, since previous empirical studies 
showed that the sorting of workers captures a significant part of the impact of spatial 
externalities on wages, both at the conditional mean (Combes et al., 2008, Mion and 
Naticchioni, 2009) and along the wage distribution (Matano and Naticchioni, 2012), the 
analysis takes into account the workers’ unobserved heterogeneity by carrying out quantile 
fixed-effect estimations.  
Our analysis shows that for unskilled workers, i.e. those at the 10th percentile, the wage 
premium takes place mainly over time, in line with the wage growth level effect. As for 
skilled workers, i.e. those at the 90th percentile of the distribution, the wage level and the 
wage growth effects have a similar magnitude, suggesting that they are able to capture 
both the benefits of agglomeration economies and the dynamic gains accruing over time.  
We also take into account the recent analysis presented in De la Roca and Puga (2013), 
who claim that even fixed effects estimates may be biased when dynamic effects are not 
considered. To capture these dynamics effects, De la Roca and Puga (2013) introduce in the 
estimation different experience variables, focusing on where experience has been acquired. 
Implementing a similar specification on the sample of young workers, we show that the 
estimates of the wage level and wage growth effects do not substantially change in 
comparison to baseline estimates, with the only difference being a slight reduction in the 
wage growth effect, especially for the upper tail of the wage distribution. Interestingly, we 
also find that while experience displays decreasing returns along the wage distribution, 
experience acquired in top cities (Rome and Milan) is associated to increasing returns along 
the distribution.  
                                               
4 Our results are also confirmed when using a dichotomic classification of Italian provinces, above and below 
the density median, similarly to Glaeser and Maré (2001). These estimates are available upon request. 
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Since our analysis suggests that the wage growth effect plays a role for both skilled and 
unskilled workers, in the second part of the paper we focus on the drivers of the wage 
growth effect, i.e. on disentangling the “learning” from the “coordination” explanation. We 
consider the sample of migrants from lower to higher density provinces after migration, 
using quantile fixed effects regressions. As a proxy for between-jobs wage growth we use 
the job-change dummy (as in Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012), while as a proxy for within-job 
wage growth we use the job tenure variable (Topel, 1991). Once controlled for sorting, our 
findings show that skilled workers benefit more from better matching opportunities in 
cities, enjoying greater returns to job changes. As for unskilled workers, they benefit more 
from higher human capital accumulation, i.e. greater returns to tenure, once in cities. 
Similar results are derived using the sample of stayers in low- and high-density provinces. 
This suggests that the wage dynamics detected for the migrants can be extended to 
different groups of workers in the economy, thereby reassuring about the possible 
endogeneity of the migration choices. 
Our results clearly bring out the importance of investigating the determinants of the 
urban wage premium along the wage distribution, since the relevance of the different 
explanations differs between skilled and unskilled workers. Further, it is also worth 
stressing that taking into account the whole wage distribution affords new insights that 
prove more revealing than when conventional measures of skills are applied, such as 
education levels.5   
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on the 
urban wage premium. In Section 3, we describe the data, define the spatial variable and 
                                               
5 According to the 1996 data of the European Community Household Panel, almost 50% of Italian graduates 
were not employed in the top quartile of the wage distribution, and around 20% had a wage lower than the 
median. This suggests a substantial heterogeneity within education levels, heterogeneity that can be 
investigated by using quantile regressions.  
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present some descriptive statistic, while Section 4 sets out the empirical analysis and 
discusses the main results. The conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The explanations related to the urban wage premium have been broadly analysed by the 
literature. As stressed in the introduction, one of the seminal paper is Glaeser and Maré 
(2001), which makes use of US data (1990 census, National Longitudinal Survey of Youth -
NLSY- and Panel Study of Income Dynamics –PSID-) to analyze the migration flows from 
rural-to-urban areas (and vice versa), in order to distinguish the wage growth effect 
(interpreted as human capital accumulation) from the wage level effect (agglomeration 
economies). Their results show that the wage growth effect plays an important role. A 
similar finding is found by Lehmer and Möller (2010) for Germany: the urban wage 
premium is due more to a wage growth effect related to human capital accumulation than 
to a wage level effect, especially for more experienced workers.  
Other related papers have investigated further the main finding emphasized by Glaeser 
and Maré (2001), i.e. the wage growth effect and its determinants. Using the NLSY data, 
Wheeler (2006) shows that, on average, wage growth tends to be positively associated with 
the size of the local market. Further, he also points out that faster wage growth is related to 
job changes rather than to within-job wage growth, supporting the coordination 
explanation. On the same topic, Yankow (2006) shows that there is no statistical difference 
between urban and non-urban workers in the average wage gain from a single job change. 
However, he finds evidence that in cities there is a significantly higher frequency of job 
changes, entailing a higher cumulative wage growth related to job changes. 
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Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) use the NLSY data for the US to develop a structural on-
the-job-search model that includes all the relevant explanations that affect the urban wage 
premium (unobserved ability, search frictions, quality job matching, human capital 
accumulation and endogenous migration). They find out that human capital accumulation 
is more important among large and small cities, while wage level effects are more 
important among medium and small-sized cities.6  
Another related paper is De la Roca and Puga (2013), who claim that fixed effects 
estimates may be biased when dynamic effects are not taken into account. Using 
administrative data for Spain, they estimate a wage regression where, apart from 
controlling for cities and individual fixed effects, they introduce various experience 
variables, i.e. proxy for dynamic gains, related to where experience has been acquired and 
where it has been used. They show that in bigger cities workers obtain an immediate static 
premium and accumulate more valuable experience, which persists after workers move 
elsewhere, and which is greater for workers with higher innate ability.  
All these studies focus on the analysis of the determinants of the urban wage premium 
evaluated at the conditional mean. The original contribution of this paper is to extend the 
analysis along the whole wage distribution. Some papers have already focused on related, 
but different, distributional/inequality issues, using either aggregate data (Wheeler, 2004, 
Möller and Haas, 2003) or individual level data (Matano and Naticchioni, 2012, Combes et 
al., 2012). None of them, however, has focused on disentangling the static and dynamic 
components of the urban wage premium along the wage distribution, which is the focus of 
this paper.  
 
                                               
6 Also Gould (2007) carries out a structural analysis showing that cities offer a wage premium only to 
white-collar workers. For an in-depth survey on urban wage premium and human capital externalities 
see Halfdanarson et al. (2010) and Puga (2010). 
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3. Institutional Setting and Data Description 
Italy is generally conceived as a fairly immobile country. Actually, the Italian labour 
market is much more mobile than usually thought. Italian job flows are higher than those 
of most European countries (Gomez-Salvator et al., 2004), and wage differentials and 
inequalities are rather high, and increasing along the period considered (OECD, 2011). As 
far as the Italian wage setting is concerned, since the beginning of the nineties there is a 
two-level wage bargaining system. The first level concerns a national collective bargaining, 
which has to preserve the purchasing power of wages at the sector level by incorporating –
at least partially- expected inflation rate in wage increases, while the second level of 
bargaining (either at the regional or firm level) allows rent sharing through performance-
related pay schemes at the region/firm level (see Cappellari et al., 2012, for a description of 
the Italian institution setting).  
As for the data, we use a panel version of the Italian administrative database provided 
by INPS and elaborated by ISFOL (the Italian Institute for the Development of Vocational 
Training).7 It is an employer-employee dataset, constructed for the period 1986-2003 by 
merging the INPS employee information with the INPS employer information database. 
The units of the analysis are industrial- (manufacturing and mining) and service-
dependent workers, both part-time (converted into full-time equivalent) and full-time. We 
focus on standard labour contracts, including both blue and white collars. Moreover, we 
take into account prime-age male workers, as in Glaeser and Maré (2001) and Mion and 
Naticchioni (2009), among others. In particular, we focus on individuals aged between 25 
                                               
7 The sample scheme of the database follows individuals born on the 10th of March, June, September and 
December and therefore the proportion of this sample in the Italian employee population is approximately of 
1/90. The panel version was constructed considering only one observation per year for each worker. For those 
workers who have more than one observation per year we selected the longest contract in terms of weeks 
worked. We also eliminated the observations below (above) the 0.5th (99.5th) percentile of the wage 
distribution.  
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and 49 (when they first enter the database).8 We consider only those workers that are in the 
dataset for at least three years, in order to get more reliable within estimations.9 By doing 
so, we eventually have an unbalanced panel of 49,526 workers for 463,247 observations. As 
for worker characteristics, the database contains individual information such as age, 
gender, occupation, workplace, worker status (part-time or full-time), real gross yearly 
wage and the number of months, weeks and days worked. For firms, we have the plant 
location (province), the size (number of employees), and the sector.  
Using INPS provincial data on industrial and service employment for the period 1986-
2003, we can define the employment density, which represents the proxy for urban 
agglomeration. It is defined as in Combes (2000), Mion and Naticchioni (2009), Matano and 
Naticchioni (2012) and De Blasio and Di Addario (2005): employment in province p at time 
t out of the province area in square km. The spatial breakdown is hence given by the 
province (provincia), classified in 95 units.10  
We define the following groups in order to classify workers’ movements: migrants from 
lower to higher density provinces, i.e. workers who move to a province with higher 
density with respect to the one they come from; migrants from higher to lower density 
provinces, i.e. workers who move to a province with lower density with respect to the one 
                                               
8 We do not consider, as standard in this literature (Topel, 1991), women and older workers since their wage 
dynamics is also affected by non-economic factors.  
9 In particular, in our sample we consider only workers with observations continuously available, i.e. available 
for consecutive years, since if data are missing for some years it is not possible to establish the patterns of 
worker’s career dynamics. Moreover, we do not consider observations for migrants before and after ten years 
from migration, since we claim that ten years are a sufficient time span to investigate the wage dynamics 
before and after the migration. Hence, observations for migrants are considered when they remain at least 
three consecutive years in the dataset and for a maximum of ten years before/after the migration. 
10 The Italian provinces follow the European NUTS3 classification. We make use of 95 provinces, which was 
the number of provinces in the first year of analysis (1986). In recent years the number of provinces has risen 
to 103. Therefore, we reclassified the individuals belonging to the new provinces into the corresponding initial 
95-province classification. Note that Italian provinces are more than administrative areas, and that they have 
to be thought as functional aggregates, encompassing local labour markets. From an historical point of view, 
Italian provinces can be related to the Italian Renaissance period, characterized by many flourishing cities and 
the accompanying surrounding areas.  
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they come from; stayers, defined as workers who never change province.11 To provide a 
spatial characterization of stayers, we split this group into stayers in high density provinces 
(HD) and stayers in low density provinces (LD) on the basis of the (time average) median 
value of the density, computed on individual observations.12  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the different workers’ groups. As expected, 
the average wage of stayers is lower in LD provinces, while the average wage for migrants 
is close to those of stayers in HD provinces. Migrants are also generally slightly younger 
and are relatively more concentrated in white collar occupations, as stayers in HD 
provinces. Further, migrants from lower to higher density provinces as well as stayers in 
HD provinces work in larger firms. Finally, migrants and stayers in HD provinces are 
relatively more concentrated in the service sector, while greater representation in the 
industry sector is found for stayers in LD provinces.  
 










                                               
11 This definition of movers implies that each movement across cities is classified as a movement toward a 
higher or lower density province, with respect to the province of departure. This is to overcome arbitrary 
spatial definition of high/low density areas and to allow flexibility in the definition of the migration patterns. 
Nonetheless, we have also carried out the same analysis using a dichotomic spatial classification (low and 
high density provinces according to the -time average- median of density computed on individual 
observations) where we define as migrants only those workers moving from a low (high) to a high (low) 
density province. Results are robust to this change in the definition of movers (see estimates in Matano and 
Naticchioni, 2013). 
12 Note that if an individual moves more than once between different sized provinces, he/she may "score" 
more than once in the analysis. We do not consider workers moving three or more times between different 
sized provinces, who in any case account for a very small fraction of the workers in the sample.  
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1.  The Extent of the Wage Level and the Wage Growth Effect along the Wage 
Distribution  
We use a quantile regression approach to investigate the role of the wage level and the 
wage growth effect in determining the urban wage premium along the wage distribution.13 
Following Glaeser and Maré (2001), we estimate a wage quantile regression with dummies 




where θ refers to the percentile, i to individuals, s to sectors, r to regions, t to time and j 
stands for the dummies concerning year intervals before (“10 to 5”, “4 to 3”, “2 to 1”), after 
(“1 to 2”, “3 to 4”, “5 to 10”) and for the migration year (“0”)), with j є Ti is the individual 
time span. The superscripts l-h stands for migrants from lower to higher density provinces, 
while h-l stands for migrants from higher to lower density provinces. 
The dependent variable in our regressions is the (log) real gross weekly wage in euro. 
Wages have been deflated using the national Consumer Price Index (FOI index, Indice dei 
Prezzi al Consumo per le Famiglie di Operai e Impiegati, ISTAT). The base year is 2002. We do 
not apply cost of living adjustments for two main reasons.14 First, because we are interested 
in the firms’ willingness to pay higher wages and not in the location choice of workers. 
Second, because Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012) show that using wages not deflated by cost 
of living does not prove a major problem when working with differenced data. In our 
                                               
13 For an in depth discussion of methodological issues concerning the identification of the urban premium see 
Combes et al. (2011). 
14 Note also that regional/provincial cost of living indexes are not available in Italy. The Italian National 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) only provides provincial (NUTS-3) inflation rates, without providing information 
on provincial price levels.  
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analysis this consideration applies since we work with deviations from within individual 
average. As for the variables of interest, hl tjI ,  (with j=(-10-5,…,+5-+10)) stands for a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one when the worker, at time t, moved (will move) j years 
before (after) from a lower to a higher density province, while lh tjI ,  stands for a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the worker, at time t, moved (will move) j years 
before (after) from a higher to a lower density province. Hence, the estimates of hlj  and 
th
j
  reflect the dynamics of wages before or after a move.  
As for the other variables, the term I_Chari,t is a set of observed individual characteristics 
(age, age squared, blue collar dummy) and Firmsizei,t is the proxy for firm heterogeneity,15 
while φs, λr, δt are sector, region (NUTS2 level) and time dummies respectively. We carry 
out estimates for the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles.  
Table 2 shows the cross sectional quantile regression results. The omitted category is 
‘stayers in LD provinces’. We also provide the coefficients for the stayers in HD provinces. 
It is worth noting that stayers in HD provinces earn significantly more than stayers in LD 
provinces. This confirms that the bulk of wage differences across the space dimension is 
also due to stayers, as emphasized by Mion and Naticchioni (2009). Moreover, the urban 
wage premium for stayers in HD provinces with respect to those in LD provinces increases 
along the wage distribution, ranging from 1.5% at the bottom of the wage distribution to 
4.4% at the top. This means that skilled workers have a greater advantage in working in 
HD areas, in line with Matano and Naticchioni (2012).  
Let us now move on to the analysis of the groups of migrants, starting from the 
migrants from lower to higher density provinces. It is interesting to note that using 
quantile regressions allows for better characterization of the wage dynamics of migrants, 
                                               
15 We proxy the firm heterogeneity using the firm size, since firm productivity and wages are positively 
related with firm size (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006). 
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both before and after migration. More specifically, from table 2 it emerges that skilled 
workers, at the 90th percentile, experience a wage increase even before migration, 
suggesting that the sample of migrants at the 90th percentile is positively selected with 
respect to stayers in LD provinces, consistent with the intuitions of Borjas (1987). On the 
contrary, migrants at the 10th percentile represent a negative selection of the reference 
group of workers, since they experience a wage loss just (1-2 years) before migration. For 
workers at the median, instead, the wage dynamics just before migration is only slightly 
higher than that of the workers remaining in LD provinces. These findings suggests that 
unskilled workers mainly decide to migrate to a dense region after a negative shock in 
their current job, while for skilled workers the migration to dense regions is a tool to 
improve their already increasing wage dynamics.  
As for the extent of the wage level and wage growth effect along the wage distribution, 
we begin with some considerations on the analysis of average wages, derived by using 
Ordinary Least Square. It may be noted that the wage level effect – the difference in wages 
within a year after the migration with respect to 1-2 years before the migration- is 
negligible (0.1%) while the greatest part of the wage increase occurs after migration: the 
wage growth effect amounts to 8.6% (12.1% minus 3.5%). These findings are consistent 
with those of Glaeser and Maré (2001), who emphasize the importance of the wage growth 
effect.   
Similar patterns are derived when considering the median, and this is hardly surprising 
since the distribution of the dependent variable, i.e. the log weekly wage, should come 
fairly close to a symmetric distribution. In particular, it emerges that at the median the 
entire wage premium arises essentially some years after migration, since the wage level 
effect is even negative but negligible (-0.3%).  
 14 
Different and more interesting findings are derived when the tails of the wage 
distribution are taken into account. On the one hand, for workers at the bottom of the wage 
distribution (10th percentile) there is a slight negative wage level effect (-1.1%, from -2.4% to 
-3.5%). Nonetheless, in the years following migration wages tend to rise and after 3-4 years 
these workers earn significantly more than unskilled workers in LD provinces (+3.8%); the 
premium increases further after 5-10 years (+5.1%). This is in line with the wage growth 
hypothesis. 
In the case of skilled workers (90th wage percentile) the pattern is different. In fact, the 
wage level effect is positive and amounts to a 1.5% (from 5.4% to 6.9%). This finding 
suggests that for skilled workers agglomeration economies play a role in determining the 
urban wage premium. At the same time, there is evidence of a significant wage growth 
effect since the urban wage premium tends to increase over time (16.2% after 5-10 years).16 
As for the migration from higher to lower density provinces, it is noteworthy that, 
regardless of the wage percentile considered, there is no evidence of wage losses just after 
migration relative to 1-2 years before, consistent with the wage growth hypothesis and in 
line with Glaeser and Maré (2001). Rather, there is even a slight increase (1-2%).  
 
[table 2 around here] 
 
However, these estimates might be biased since they do not take into account the role 
of the sorting of workers. Actually, part of the wage premium imputed to agglomeration 
economies, as well as human capital accumulation and quality matching, could be due to 
                                               
16 Adding up the wage level effect (difference between coefficients just after the migration and 1-2 years 
before) and the wage growth effect (difference between coefficients after 5-10 years and just after the 
migration), it comes out that the total increase in wages is of 7.5% for workers at the 10th percentile, 6.8% for 
workers at the 50th percentile and 10.8% for workers at the 90th percentile.  
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the sorting of skilled workers into cities. In order to tackle this issue, we perform fixed 
effects estimates that allow controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity (Combes 
et al., 2008, Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, Matano and Naticchioni, 2012). 
Since we work in a quantile setting, we make use of the quantile fixed effects 
methodology proposed by Canay (2011).17 The omitted category within each group of 
migrants is that of ‘5 -10 years before the migration’.  
The results in table 3 confirm that sorting matters. In particular, considering the 
migrants from lower to higher density provinces, the difference in coefficients between 5-
10 years after the migration and 1-2 years before the migration generally decreases relative 
to previous estimates, and the reduction is greater at the highest percentiles, in line with 
Matano and Naticchioni (2012).  
In terms of decomposition between the wage growth and wage level effect, for the 
median and the mean the results differ little from previous ones, i.e. the wage level effect 
remains quite small (around 1%) and most of the wage increase occurs over time: the wage 
growth effect is equal to 3.9% at the median (5.0% minus 1.1% just after migration) and 
5.5% at the mean (6.1% minus 0.6%).  
Similarly, for low skilled workers the wage premium is essentially due to a wage 
growth effect: there is an increase immediately after migration (+0.9%, from -4.7% to -
3.8%), while most of the urban wage premium emerges over time (+7.7%, from -3.8% to 
3.9%). 
Different and indeed interesting patterns emerge for skilled workers (at the 90th 
percentile), since the urban wage premium is quite equally shared between the wage level 
effect (2.3%, from 3.5% to 5.8%), and the wage growth effect (2.8%, from 5.8% to 8.6%).  
                                               
17 We have also run the same estimates using the procedure suggested by Koenker (2004). The results are very 
similar. They are available upon request. For interested readers, a detailed explanation of the implementation 
of the Canay methodology can be found in Matano and Naticchioni (2012). 
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As for the migrants from higher to lower density provinces, fixed effects estimates 
generally confirm the cross sectional results. In particular there is no evidence of wage 
losses just after migration -relative to 1-2 years before migration- (in line with the wage 
growth hypothesis).18  
These findings suggest that while for unskilled workers the determinants of the urban 
wage premium appear to be due mainly to a wage growth effect, and hence to the 
coordination and/or learning explanation, for skilled workers the urban wage premium is 
more uniformly distributed between the wage level and the wage growth effects.  
 
[table 3 around here] 
 
4.2. The role of dynamic gain 
So far we have looked at the role of the wage growth and wage level effect in determining 
the urban wage premium along the wage distribution controlling for the sorting of 
workers. However, fixed effects estimates may be biased when dynamic gains related to 
experience in dense provinces are not taken into account (De la Roca and Puga, 2013). To 
take this issue on board, we introduce in the estimation different experience variables, 
defined according to where experience has been acquired. However, the experience 
variable is not collected in the sample of prime age workers of our dataset, i.e. we do not 
know when individuals started their working career.19 Therefore, we consider the sample 
of young workers (aged between 15-30) starting their first employment spell after January 
                                               
18 Note that also workers who move from higher to lower density provinces in general experience a wage 
increase, especially over time. This suggests that at least a part of the wage dynamics might be driven by 
migration choices. However, the magnitude of these wage increases is generally lower than the one generated 
when moving to a denser area, suggesting the existence of an urban wage premium due to spillovers 
generated in locations characterized by denser economic activity. 
19 This is mainly due to the fact that the data lack the information concerning the specific time period the 
individual entered the labour market.  
 17 
1986, for whom we can compute the experience variable within the sample.20 As a check, 
table 4 replicates for the group of young workers the fixed effects estimates derived on the 
group of prime-age workers (table 3). Results do not differ much, suggesting that the 
group of young workers displays similar spatial trends with respect to the one of prime 
age workers.21 In particular, trends of wage level and wage growth effects are the same, 
while in terms of magnitude estimates on young workers display slightly higher values for 
the 10th and 50th percentile and slightly lower for the 90th percentile.  
 
[table 4 around here] 
 
Using the sample of young workers, we introduce in the econometric specification the 
standard experience variable and two additional variables: the experience acquired in the 
two biggest Italian cities (Rome and Milan), and the experience acquired in the following 
four biggest Italian cities in terms of population (Palermo, Genoa, Turin and Naples). Table 
5 shows the results for young workers when introducing the detailed experience variables. 
First of all, it is worth noting that along the whole wage distribution all experience 
variables have a positive impact on wages, although the negative quadratic coefficient 
highlights the presence of diminishing marginal returns. To ease the interpretation we 
comment the linear coefficients. As for general experience, there is a declining impact along 
the wage distribution, from 5.3% at the 10th percentile to 2.2% at the 90th percentile. This 
                                               
20 We cannot keep individuals recorded in the database as working from January 1986, since the formal 
beginning of all these jobs in the INPS database is forced to be January 1986. Note also that for the sample of 
young workers we assume that those individuals entering the sample did not previously had any working 
experience as self-employed or in the public sector. This seems to be plausible, since self-employed and public 
sector spells are less likely when young.   
21 Note that in the estimates of table 4 we put experience instead of age, since the two variables (in levels) are 
collinear in fixed effects estimates. Therefore, results can be compared with the ones related to prime age 
workers (table 3).  
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suggests that unskilled workers benefit the most from experience in the labour market. 
However, experience acquired in Rome and Milan has a positive and increasing impact 
along the wage distribution. In particular, the returns to experience acquired in Rome and 
Milan range from 1.7% at the 10th percentile to 2.2% at the 90th percentile. As for the 
experience acquired in the other four main Italian provinces, magnitudes are lower but still 
increasing along the wage distribution (from 0.6% at the 10th percentile to 1.0% at the 90th 
percentile). The increasing trends for experience acquired in the two and four top cities 
mitigate the decreasing trend observed for the standard experience variable. Still the 
overall returns to experience, considering both linear and quadratic coefficients, are 
decreasing: for a worker who spent five years in Rome (or Milan) at the 10th percentile the 
overall returns are equal to 27.5% while at the 90th percentile are equal to 19.5%. The 
differences among percentiles would have been anyway greater without introducing the 
experience acquired in top cities.  
 
[table 5 around here] 
 
As for migration patterns, it is interesting to note that the introduction of experience 
variables only slightly affects the wage level effect, which is now equal to 0.3%, 0.8% and 
1.6% at the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile respectively. As for the wage growth effect, there is 
a general decrease, being now equal to 8.2%, 3.4% and 0.9% at the 10th, 50th and 90th 
percentile respectively. Moreover, the reduction in the wage growth effect affects more the 
upper tail of the wage distribution, i.e. the decrease is around 60% at the 90th percentile, 
28% at the 50th percentile and just 10% at the 10th percentile. This means that experience 
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acquired in top cities catches up part of the wage dynamics previously captured by 
migration dummies.22 23 
 
4.3. Focus on the Wage Growth Effect: Disentangling the “Learning” and the 
“Coordination” Effects along the Wage Distribution 
One of the findings of our paper is that a non-negligible part of the urban wage premium is 
related to a wage growth effect, consistent with Glaeser and Maré (2001). As stressed in the 
literature, the wage growth effect could be the outcome of either faster human capital 
accumulation (learning) or more efficient job searching and matching (coordination). Our 
aim in this section is to disentangle the roles of the “learning” and “coordination” effects.  
We focus on the sample of migrants from lower to higher density provinces, once they 
have moved into a higher density province. We include variables that are considered in the 
literature as proxy for the within-job wage growth (tenure, using a quadratic specification) 
and for the between-jobs wage growth (dummy for job change, as in Baum-Snow and 
Pavan, 2012). We estimate the following wage quantile regression: 
 
 
where as before θ refers to the percentile, i to individuals, s to sectors, t to time.  
                                               
22 De la Roca and Puga (2013) extend their approach by introducing interaction terms between the years of 
experience acquired by workers in main cities and the locations where the workers are currently employed. 
Their results show that these interactions are either not significant or small in magnitude, i.e. the value of 
experience is fully portable across cities. We have also run a robustness check introducing interaction terms 
between the experience acquired in main Italian cities and being currently employed in other (smaller or 
greater) provinces. Results show that our baseline estimates are not affected by the introduction of these 
interaction terms. Further, the impact of these interaction terms differ depending on the wage percentile 
considered. For the median and the average, estimates are consistent with those of De la Roca and Puga (2013), 
since they are either not significant or small in magnitude. Instead, in the lower and upper tail of the 
distribution, there are some significant effects, which suggest an interesting heterogeneity in dynamic gains 
across the wage distribution. These estimates are available upon request. 
23 We have also carried out a wide set of robustness checks concerning the following issues: unobserved 
location heterogeneity; different measures of skills; a different spatial classification; the endogeneity of 
migration; long stay migrants; endogeneity of firm size. Results confirm main findings. We do not include 
these checks in the paper for sake of synthesis. The interested reader can refer to the section “Robustness 
check” in Matano and Naticchioni (2013). 
'
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The dependent variable is again the (log) real gross weekly wage in euro. The variables 
of interest are Tenurei,t, Tenure squaredi,t –that capture firm specific human capital 
accumulation-, and the dummy Job Changei,t that takes the value of one when a worker 
changes job in the corresponding year.24 All the other variables are the same as in the 
previous section. In table 6 we set out the estimates derived by means of the quantile fixed 
effect regression to control for the sorting of workers. 
The results show that the impact of within- and between-jobs components on wages is 
not uniform along the wage distribution. In fact, the unskilled workers’ wage growth (10th-
25th wage percentiles) is due mainly to positive –marginally diminishing - returns to 
tenure, suggesting that firm specific human capital accumulation plays a substantial role. 
For instance an unskilled worker (10th/25th percentile) who has moved to a higher density 
area gets a wage increase of 2.5%/0.5% after 5 years spent in the same firm. Further, the 
linear coefficient of the returns to tenure decreases along the wage distribution, becoming 
negative at the 90th percentile, even if the quadratic term switches to positive. This suggests 
that for skilled workers job tenure plays only a minor role. 
As for the impact of job changes, this is positive for skilled workers (75th and 90th 
percentile), suggesting better matching opportunities in dense area, consistent with 
Wheeler (2006). Returns to job changes are instead negative for unskilled workers.25  
                                               
24 In our data it is not possible to identify firms belonging to the same financial group. Further, in some cases 
different establishments within the same firm might have different social security codes as they were different 
firms. For this reason, we cannot address interesting issues such as intra-firm and intra-group mobility.  
25 In the sample there is no information on whether the workers’ job changes are voluntary. One might actually 
argue that not controlling for this issue might affect our estimates. For this reason, we have run a robustness 
check defining as voluntary those job changes characterized by an unemployment spell between the old and 
the new job lower or equal to two months. Hence, non-voluntary job changes are those with unemployment 
spells longer than two months. When carrying out the same econometric estimation for the two groups of 
movers, voluntary vs non voluntary, results interestingly show that penalties at the lowest percentiles are 
driven by a negative impact of non-voluntary job changes, while at the highest percentile the impact is mainly 
driven by voluntary job changes. Since the chosen definition of voluntary job change is arbitrary, we do not 
put too much emphasis on these estimates, which are anyway available upon request.  
 21 
Combining these findings, it clearly emerges that in dense areas unskilled workers 
advance in their careers by remaining in their jobs, while skilled workers benefit by 
exploiting matching opportunities.26  
 
[table 6 around here] 
 
However, one might argue that the sample of migrants from lower to higher density 
provinces is not representative of the whole economy (Mion and Naticchioni, 2009, Baum-
Snow and Pavan, 2012). For this reason, we carry out the same econometric specification -
including tenure and job change dummies- on the sample of stayers using the dichotomic 
classification of LD and HD, i.e. stayers in the sense that they remain in the same LD or HD 
area although they may change jobs within the area. Since the results derived from the 
sample of stayers are very similar to those derived from the group of migrants (table 7), 
our findings may well be taken as representative of the whole economy.27 28 
 
[table 7 around here] 
 
Moreover, we also verify whether there is a higher incidence of job changes in HD 
provinces, as argued in Yankow (2006), which would entail a greater cumulative wage 
growth. On the evidence of table 8 the overall job change incidence can be seen to be 
                                               
26 We have run the same estimates using the sample of young workers and introducing the detailed experience 
variables, as in table 5. Results are very close from a qualitatively point of view. They are available upon 
request. 
27 Estimates for tenure in tables 6 and 7 can actually change sign after some years (around 7-10) from the 
migration, due to the quadratic term. Nonetheless this change concerns a relatively few number of 
observations in the sample (around 1.2%), thus suggesting that this issue should not represent a main concern 
of the analysis.  
28 There might be some degree of interaction between tenure and the job change dummy. For this reason, we 
have run the same estimates for migrants including one at a time the tenure and the job change variable; 
results remain consistent and are available upon request.  
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basically the same for the group of stayers in LD provinces (9%) and for the group of 
stayers in HD provinces (8.8%), and a similar incidence is observed for the group of 
migrants from lower to higher density provinces after migration (8.5%). However, since we 
work in a quantile framework we aim at enriching the analysis of Yankow (2006) by 
investigating whether the differences between different sized provinces in the incidence of 
job changes vary along the wage distribution. To do so we compute the incidence of job 
changes for the four quartiles of the wage distribution.  
From table 8 it emerges that for the first three quartiles of the wage distribution there are 
decidedly negligible differences in the incidence of job changes between the groups of 
stayers in LD provinces and the stayers in HD provinces. Interestingly, in the first quartile 
the incidence of job changes for migrants is almost two percentage points higher than for 
stayers. Since for this group returns to job changes are negative, this entails a stronger 
cumulative penalization for low skilled workers due to job mobility.  
Further, it is interesting to note that at the fourth quartile the incidence of job changes 
for the group of stayers in high density provinces (7.5%) is higher than for the group of 
stayers in low density provinces (6.5%), while an intermediate values is observed for the 
group of migrants (7.1%). This evidence points out that skilled workers have a higher 
incidence of job change in HD provinces than in LD provinces. This also means that for 
skilled workers not only are the returns to each single job change higher in HD provinces 
(tables 6 and 7) but also the incidence of job changes, suggesting that the cumulative 
returns to job changes are even higher than those shown in tables 6 and 7.   
 
[table 8 around here] 
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All these findings suggest that for skilled workers the driving force of wage growth 
dynamics in dense areas is largely a matter of better matching opportunities, while for 
unskilled workers it is related to human capital accumulation, in line with the learning 
explanation.29 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate whether, and if so to what extent, the determinants of the 
urban wage premium, in terms of agglomeration economies, human capital accumulation 
and quality matching, differ along the wage distribution. Having controlled for the sorting 
of workers by means of quantile fixed effect regressions, we arrive at the following 
findings.  
First, the patterns of the urban wage premium are far from homogeneous along the 
wage distribution. In particular, skilled workers enjoy wage premiums that are balanced 
between a wage level effect at the time of migration and a wage growth effect. For low 
skilled workers the urban wage premium is due to a wage growth effect, since wages 
increase over time.  
Our findings are robust to control for experience acquired in bigger cities, in line with 
recent literature (De la Roca and Puga, 2013). Interestingly, we also show that while 
                                               
29 Our findings are to some extent not consistent with those derived by Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012). 
However, the two papers differ for many aspects such as the sample, the econometric approach and the 
countries analysed, among others. To make the two approaches more comparable, we carry out a robustness 
check for the sample of prime age workers, using the age variable, proxy for experience in the labour market. 
In particular, we use a specification including the linear term of age separated for workers in LD and HD 
provinces, and the quadratic term in common between LD and HD provinces, as in Baum-Snow and Pavan 
(2012) for the experience variable. In the specification we also include the job change dummies and all the 
covariates of table 7 (excluding tenure). When focusing on the conditional mean, the results come closer to 
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012), i.e. the coordination explanation plays a very negligible role. However, when 
considering the two tails of the distribution our findings are still confirmed: skilled workers benefit more from 
job changes while unskilled workers benefit more from human capital accumulation. These estimates are 
available upon request. 
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experience displays decreasing returns along the wage distribution, experience acquired in 
top cities (Rome and Milan) is associated to increasing returns along the distribution.  
Second, we further investigate the determinants of the wage growth effect in dense 
areas. For both migrants to higher density provinces and stayers in LD and HD provinces, 
within-job wage growth is an important driver of the wage growth effect for unskilled 
workers, and this effect is stronger in HD provinces: unskilled workers benefit more from 
human capital accumulation in dense areas. On the contrary, for skilled workers it is more 
the between-jobs wage growth that matters and this effect is stronger in HD provinces: in 
dense areas there are better matching opportunities for skilled workers.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Stayers and Migrants.
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Real Weekly Wage (log) 6.00 0.38 4.25 8.73 6.14 0.42 4.25 9.23
Age 42.05 8.06 25 66 42.47 8.06 25 67
Blue Collar 0.71 0.45 0 1 0.58 0.49 0 1
White Collar 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.42 0.49 0 1
Firm Size (log) 4.60 2.69 0 12.11 5.25 2.80 0 12.11
North West 0.23 0.42 0 1 0.51 0.50 0 1
North East 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1
Centre 0.21 0.40 0 1 0.19 0.39 0 1
South 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
Island 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.00 0.00 0 0
Industry 0.66 0.47 0 1 0.59 0.49 0 1
Services 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.41 0.49 0 1
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Real Weekly Wage (log) 6.16 0.49 4.27 8.87 6.16 0.50 4.25 9.04
Age 40.56 7.81 25 65 40.62 7.93 25 67
Blue Collar 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.52 0.50 0 1
White Collar 0.48 0.50 0 1 0.48 0.50 0 1
Firm Size (log) 5.25 2.66 0 12.07 5.15 2.54 0 12.11
North West 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.36 0.48 0 1
North East 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.25 0.43 0 1
Centre 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1
South 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Island 0.06 0.25 0 1 0.06 0.24 0 1
Industry 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.60 0.49 0 1
Services 0.41 0.49 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Source: Panel INPS (processed by ISFOL) data. Number of observations in brackets.
Stayers Low Density (179,431) Stayers High Density (197,125)





q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.026*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.032***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
0.036*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.050***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.010] [0.004]
0.017*** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.045*** 0.057*** 0.053***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004]
-0.024*** 0.004 0.018*** 0.036*** 0.054*** 0.034***
[0.007] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003]
-0.035*** -0.008 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.069*** 0.035***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.011] [0.004]
0.007 0.016*** 0.041*** 0.076*** 0.105*** 0.073***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.008] [0.004]
0.038*** 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.099*** 0.137*** 0.099***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.007] [0.008] [0.015] [0.005]
0.051*** 0.054*** 0.086*** 0.125*** 0.162*** 0.121***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.010] [0.004]
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.072*** 0.054***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004]
0.008* 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 0.049***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.010] [0.004]
-0.047*** -0.010** 0.017*** 0.039*** 0.066*** 0.025***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.003]
-0.028*** 0.003 0.031*** 0.062*** 0.086*** 0.052***
[0.007] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004]
0.005 0.022*** 0.044*** 0.078*** 0.103*** 0.074***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.004]
0.034*** 0.042*** 0.059*** 0.095*** 0.126*** 0.094***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.007] [0.011] [0.005]
0.045*** 0.054*** 0.063*** 0.093*** 0.131*** 0.096***
[0.007] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004]
N. of Observations 463,247 463,247 463,247 463,247 463,247 463,247
N. of Individuals 49,526 49,526 49,526 49,526 49,526 49,526
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Control variables are age, age
squared, occupation dummies, firm size and regional, sector and time dummies.
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Moving to a province of lower density:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Table 2: Wage Dynamics of Migrants. Quantile Regression.
Stayer in a High Density province
Moving to a province of higher density:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move






q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
       -        -        -        -        -        -
      -       -       -       -       -       -
-0.016*** -0.003 0.005** 0.010*** 0.024*** 0.001
[0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
-0.047*** -0.015*** -0.002** 0.012*** 0.035*** -0.009***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
-0.038*** -0.006*** 0.011*** 0.029*** 0.058*** 0.006**
[0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
0.009** 0.021*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.064*** 0.033***
[0.004] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
0.028*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.045***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
0.039*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.086*** 0.061***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
      -       -       -       -       -       -
-0.030*** -0.009*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.001
[0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
-0.042*** -0.007*** 0.012*** 0.029*** 0.055*** 0.005*
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
-0.031*** 0.001 0.022*** 0.040*** 0.072*** 0.018***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003]
0.006** 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.061*** 0.033***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
0.032*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.050*** 0.068*** 0.045***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004]
0.030*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.074*** 0.045***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004]
N. of Observations 463,247 463,247 463,247 463,247 463,247 463,247
N. of Individuals 49,526 49,526 49,526 49,526 49,526 49,526
Table 3: Wage Dynamics of Migrants. Quantile Fixed Effects Regression (Canay, 2011).
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Stayers
Moving to a province of higher density:
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Control variables are age, age
squared, occupation dummies, firm size and regional, sector and time dummies.
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Moving to a province of lower density:





q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
0.057*** 0.045*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.041***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
-0.187*** -0.132*** -0.089*** -0.055*** -0.017*** -0.102***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
      -       -       -       -       -       -
-0.024*** -0.013*** 0.002 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.000
[0.006] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
-0.056*** -0.019*** 0.004** 0.026*** 0.045*** -0.003
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004]
-0.047*** -0.009*** 0.016*** 0.037*** 0.064*** 0.011**
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
0.008** 0.024*** 0.037*** 0.049*** 0.071*** 0.037***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
0.036*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.069*** 0.052***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
0.045*** 0.053*** 0.063*** 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.067***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.005]
      -       -       -       -       -       -
-0.018*** -0.010*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.030*** 0.004
[0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.004]
-0.051*** -0.020*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.055*** -0.003
[0.003] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
-0.055*** -0.018*** 0.008*** 0.030*** 0.055*** 0.001
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
-0.005** 0.012*** 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.020***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
0.013** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.049*** 0.030***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005]
0.016*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.050*** 0.066*** 0.038***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
N. of Observations 286,258 286,258 286,258 286,258 286,258 286,258
N. of Individuals 36,077 36,077 36,077 36,077 36,077 36,077
† Coefficients and standard errors of this variable are multiplied by 100 to ease the intepretation.
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Table 4: Wage Dynamics of Migrants. Sample of Young Workers (15-30).  Quantile Fixed Effects Regression.
Experience 
Experience squared†
Moving to a province of higher density:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Control variables are occupation
dummies, firm size and regional, sector and time dummies.
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Moving to a province of lower density:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
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q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
0.053*** 0.042*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.022*** 0.037***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
-0.173*** -0.120*** -0.075*** -0.042*** 0.001 -0.088***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.001]
0.017*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.020***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
-0.058*** -0.065*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.071***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005]
0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.007***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
-0.022*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.051*** -0.029***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008] [0.006]
      -       -       -       -       -       -
-0.020*** -0.009** 0.006** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.005
[0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
-0.047*** -0.012*** 0.011*** 0.032*** 0.053*** 0.004
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004]
-0.044*** -0.003 0.019*** 0.040*** 0.069*** 0.015***
[0.008] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004]
0.008* 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.050*** 0.070*** 0.038***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
0.034*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.068*** 0.049***
[0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
0.038*** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.078*** 0.058***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
      -       -       -       -       -       -
-0.023*** -0.017*** -0.003 0.006** 0.023*** -0.002
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
-0.062*** -0.031*** -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.043*** -0.015***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
-0.064*** -0.030*** -0.003 0.019*** 0.044*** -0.010**
[0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004]
-0.014*** 0.003 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.039*** 0.011**
[0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004]
0.008 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.042*** 0.024***
[0.006] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005]
0.012*** 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.062*** 0.036***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
N. of Observations 286,258 286,258 286,258 286,258 286,258 286,258
N. of Individuals 36,077 36,077 36,077 36,077 36,077 36,077
† Coefficients and standard errors of this variable are multiplied by 100 to ease the interpretation.




Experience in Rome and Milan
Observed 3-4 years before a move
Observed 1-2 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Experience squared (Rome and Milan)†
Experience in other 4 major provinces of Italy
Experience squared in other 4 major provinces 
of Italy†
Moving to a province of higher density:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed within a year after a move
Observed 1-2 years after a move
Observed 3-4 years after a move
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. Control variables are occupation dummies,
firm size and regional, sector and time dummies. The other 4 major provinces of Italy are: Genoa, Naple, Turin and Palermo.
Observed 5-10 years after a move
Moving to a province of lower density:
Observed 5-10 years before a move
Observed 3-4 years before a move






q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 Mean
Job Change -0.031*** -0.020*** -0.005 0.013*** 0.024*** -0.003
[0.009] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005]
Tenure 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.002** -0.002 -0.006** 0.003*
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Tenure squared† -0.163*** -0.091*** -0.030** 0.042** 0.096*** -0.026
[0.002] [0.010] [0.012] [0.019] [0.027] [0.018]
Age 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.069***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm size 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Blue collar dummy -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.082*** -0.067***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] [0.014]
Constant 3.973*** 4.230*** 4.318*** 4.473*** 4.641*** 4.328***
[0.053] [0.018] [0.020] [0.030] [0.053] [0.088]
N. of Observations 19,503 19,503 19,503 19,503 19,503 19,503
N. of Individuals 4,003 4,003 4,003 4,003 4,003 4,003
† Coefficients and standard errors of this variable are multiplied by 100 to ease the interpretation.
Table 6: Returns to Tenure and to Job Changes. Sample of Migrants from Lower to Higher Density
Provinces after the Migration. Quantile Fixed Effects Regressions.  
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. The other





q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 mean
Job Change  HD -0.019*** -0.008*** 0.002 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.007***
[0.004] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002]
Job Change  LD -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.010*** 0.004 0.020*** -0.008***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002]
Tenure HD 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.009***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Tenure squared HD† -0.145*** -0.085*** -0.046*** -0.017*** 0.000 -0.071***
[0.006] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
Tenure LD 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.000 -0.003*** -0.007*** 0.003***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Tenure squared LD† -0.115*** -0.065*** -0.025*** 0.005 0.039*** -0.042***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004]
Age 0.061*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.054***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001]
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Firm size 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.014***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Blue collar dummy -0.070*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.083*** -0.099*** -0.083***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.003]
Constant 4.210*** 4.455*** 4.593*** 4.743*** 4.941*** 4.480***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010] [0.016] [0.020]
N. of Observations 190,386 190,386 190,386 190,386 190,386 190,386
N. of Individuals 24,869 24,869 24,869 24,869 24,869 24,869
† Coefficients and standard errors of this variable are multiplied by 100 to ease the interpretation.
Table 7: Returns to Tenure and to Job Changes in High (HD) and Low Density (LD) Provinces. Sample of
Stayers. Quantile Fixed Effects Estimates. 
Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis with ***,** and * denoting significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectevely. The other control




Stayers in LD Stayers in HD
Migrants from lower to 
higher density provinces
Overall 9.0 8.8 8.5
1st quartile 11.4 11.8 13.3
2nd quartile 8.7 8.5 8.2
3rd quartile 7.4 7.7 6.7
4th quartile 6.5 7.5 7.1
Table 8: Incidence of Job Changes along the Quartiles of the Wage
Distribution. Samples of Stayers in LD, Stayers in HD, and Migrants from
Lower to Higher Density Provinces after the Migration.
 
